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Abstract
Background: The majority of emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic (transmissible between animals and humans) in
origin, and therefore integrated surveillance of disease events in humans and animals has been recommended to support
effective global response to disease emergence. While in the past decade there has been extensive global surveillance for
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) infection in both animals and humans, there have been few attempts to compare
these data streams and evaluate the utility of such integration.
Methodology: We compared reports of bird outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 in Egypt for 2006–2011 compiled by the World
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) EMPRESi reporting system with
confirmed human H5N1 cases reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) for Egypt during the same time period.
Principal Findings: Both human cases and bird outbreaks showed a cyclic pattern for the country as a whole, and there was
a statistically significant temporal correlation between the data streams. At the governorate level, the first outbreak in birds
in a season usually but not always preceded the first human case, and the time lag between events varied widely,
suggesting regional differences in zoonotic risk and/or surveillance effectiveness. In a multivariate risk model, lower
temperature, lower urbanization, higher poultry density, and the recent occurrence of a bird outbreak were associated with
increased risk of a human case of HPAI in the same governorate, although the positive predictive value of a bird outbreak
was low.
Conclusions: Integrating data streams of surveillance for human and animal cases of zoonotic disease holds promise for
better prediction of disease risk and identification of environmental and regional factors that can affect risk. Such efforts can
also point out gaps in human and animal surveillance systems and generate hypotheses regarding disease transmission.
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Introduction
The majority of emerging infectious diseases in recent decades
are zoonotic (transmissible between animals and humans) in origin
[1], a fact underscored by the recent global spread of novel H1N1
influenza A. As part of an effective global response to such disease
emergence, there has been calls for integrated surveillance of
zoonotic disease events in human and animal populations,
although to date, there have been few examples of such data
integration [2].
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 represents
both an epizootic of enormous scope and a significant pandemic
threat to human health. Since the onset of the current epizootic in
1996, extensive surveillance efforts in both animal and human
populations have taken place on a global scale. While at present
avian influenza remains predominantly an animal disease, with
sporadic zoonotic transmission to humans and apparently limited
human-to-human transmission, there is ongoing risk for the
emergence of strains with increased transmissibility. It is therefore
a public health priority to reduce human risk for avian influenza
infection by controlling the infection at its source (animal
populations), and also taking steps to reduce the possibility of
animal-human (zoonotic) transmission. Avian influenza accord-
ingly provides an opportunity to test the utility of integrating
human and animal disease surveillance data streams.
Currently, disease surveillance for cases of HPAI infection is
carried out separately for humans and animals. Ministries of
health in different countries report confirmed human cases of
avian influenza to the World Health Organization (WHO), which
lists these reports on the public WHO avian influenza website [3].
Meanwhile, national ministries of agriculture report outbreaks of
avian influenza in birds to the World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE), which also makes public these disease reports.
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There is currently no official integration of these surveillance data
streams.
To date, comparisons of human and animal HPAI surveillance
data have been largely descriptive, such as displaying maps or
tables showing both human and animal cases [4]. Such descriptive
mapping reveals that there is a good deal of spatial overlap
between human and animal disease occurrence. However, to date
there has been little analysis of statistical relationships between
Figure 1. Epidemic curve for bird outbreaks and human cases of H5N1 in Egypt 2006–2011.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043851.g001
Figure 2. Normalized curves for human cases and bird outbreaks of H5N1 in Egypt.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043851.g002
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human and animal surveillance data streams for HPAI, including
the identification of risk factors for linkage between animal and
human risk, or the creation of predictive models for forecasting
and early intervention to prevent further human cases. Such
integrated approaches to surveillance could improve prevention
and control efforts for both human and animal health.
Egypt is one of the countries most affected by HPAI in both
animal and human populations. In 2006, at the same time that the
virus was appearing in other African countries [5] there were
widespread outbreaks in Egyptian commercial and domestic
poultry flocks caused by a strain of influenza A H5N1 of Eurasian
origin [6], possibly introduced into the country by wild birds [7,8].
Shortly following the onset of these poultry outbreaks, the first
human cases appeared in the country. As of June 2012, Egypt had
reported 168 human cases of HPAI with 60 fatalities, making it the
second most affected country in terms of human cases, after
Indonesia [3]. Previous reports have noted that human cases tend
to occur more in the winter months, and in the Nile Delta region,
with the majority of cases appearing in individuals less than
18 years of age [9]. The ongoing occurrence of cases of H5N1
infection in both poultry and humans in Egypt places this region at
risk of being a secondary epicenter for further spread of the disease
[10]. While separate studies have reported on the epidemiology of
avian influenza in Egypt in birds (source) and in humans [9], no
studies to date have directly compared the two surveillance data
streams.
We therefore performed an analysis of the relationship between
reported surveillance cases of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian
influenza in birds and humans in Egypt from 2006–2010. The
objective of the study was to determine whether reports of bird
outbreaks could be used to predict human infection risk, and to
characterize the temporal relationships between the data streams.
Materials and Methods
We created and analyzed an integrated data set containing
information from human and animal surveillance data streams as
well as demographic and other risk information available at the
governorate level for Egypt.
Sources of H5N1 Surveillance Data
Laboratory confirmed reports of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in
poultry and other birds were obtained from two sources: the online
surveillance reports submitted by Egypt to the World Organisation
for Animal Health (OIE) [11], and the EMPRESi database
maintained by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO-
list website source). These records contain information on the date,
location, species involved, number of affected and culled animals.
OIE data were used for 2006–2008, after which the EMPRESi
data became more complete and were therefore used for
subsequent years.
Data on human H5N1 cases in Egypt between 2006 and 2011
were obtained from the situation update archives on the WHO
avian influenza website [3]. These represent laboratory confirmed
cases reported by Egypt to WHO. For some of the human cases,
the situation updates listed the apparent date of disease onset,
while for others only a date of hospitalization or death was
available. For the purposes of analysis, two of the authors
independently reviewed the situation updates and recorded, for
each human case, the earliest associated date. A process of
consensus resolved any discrepancies between the dates recorded
by the two observers. The location provided for most of the human
cases in the WHO situation updates was at the governorate level;
only rarely was more detailed geographic information available on
human cases.
Figure 3. A. Bird outbreaks of H5N1 by governorate 2006–2011. B. Human cases of H5N1 by governorate 2006–2011.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043851.g003
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Demographic Variables
Statistics for gross domestic product (GDP), human population
density, and urbanization of each Egyptian governorate were
obtained from United Nations Human Development reports [12]
and demographic databases [13]. Poultry density maps for Egypt
published by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
were obtained from the FAO website [14]. Using ArcGIS 9.2,
shape files of the Egyptian governorates [15] were used to analyze
these poultry density maps and calculate a value of poultry density
for each governorate. These statistics were included in the
multivariate risk models.
Climate Data
Daily records for temperature and humidity for each day of the
study period (2005–2011) in the principal city of each governorate
were downloaded from a publicly available website [16]. For
governorates without weather data, we assigned the nearest
governorate as a proxy. These data were used to calculate rolling
30-day average temperature and humidity values for each
governorate during the study period.
Temporal Comparison of Human and Bird Surveillance
We performed three types of temporal comparisons of human
and bird H5N1 surveillance data: superimposition of the
epidemiologic curves, a statistical permutation test of temporal
concordance, and calculation of time lags between the first human
and bird cases in a governorate. For these comparisons, the
occurrence of a bird outbreak (rather than the total number of
birds affected) was used, since the available data for outbreak size
was noted to be incomplete and highly variable.
First, the epidemic curve for bird H5N1 outbreaks between
2006 and 2011 and the epidemic curve for human H5N1 cases
over the same period were superimposed to allow for descriptive
visual comparison.
Next, we tested for temporal concordance between the time
series data sets of human H5N1 cases and bird H5N1 outbreaks
using a permutation test that was constructed as follows. Data
from the two time series were aggregated over calendar weeks. To
smooth the noisiness of the surveillance data, the average of counts
was calculated over a three-week period.
To test concordance of the human and bird H5N1 surveillance
data streams, we performed a permutation test that calculated the
sum of the squared difference between the normalized event values
(number of human cases and number of bird outbreaks) for
different temporal alignments of the data. The distribution of the
set of all possible alignments was estimated. From this distribution,
individual alignments could be statistically evaluated. To estimate
the distribution of alignments, we began by letting the vectors h
and b represent the values for human H5N1 cases and bird H5N1
outbreaks in a particular week. We defined the distance between
these two vectors as the sum of the square of the individual
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We defined n as the number of values in each of the time series
and let hi and bi denote the ith elements of the human and bird
time series respectively.
Next, we let B denote the circulant matrix generated by the
vector b:
Figure 4. A. Population density map (people per square km), Egypt. B. Poultry density map (poultry head per sq km), Egypt.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043851.g004
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The columns of B correspond to rotations on the original vector
b. The distance between the vector h and the jth rotation of B can
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where Bi,j is the element in the ith row and jth column of B. We
postulated that if there was no temporal association between
human H5N1 cases and bird H5N1 outbreaks then T(h, BNj) would
not be significantly different than the distance between h and any
of the other rotations of b. Using this as the null hypothesis, a p-
value can then be calculated by finding T(h, BNj) for each 1,j,= n
and then by finding the proportion of test statistics smaller than
T(h, BNj), which is the test statistic for the alignment of the data. It
should be noted that since, under the null, rotations are distributed
uniformly at random, this is equivalent to sampling columns of B,
finding the test statistic, and then finding the proportion of random
alignment at least as small as T(h, BNj). Since the p-value of the data
alignment was 0.01% (see Results), we were able to reject the null
hypothesis.
Second, the time lag between reported bird and human cases
was analyzed by determining the number of days between the date
of the first animal case reported in a particular governorate and
the first human case reported in the same area. Because the
epidemic curve demonstrated on visual inspection that there was
an apparent seasonal cycling of cases in both birds and humans,
with highest rates during the winter season and lowest rates in the
fall, we calculated time lags for each of the three September-
September periods between 2005 and 2011.
Multivariate Risk Modeling
We performed bivariate and multivariate analyses of a number
of risk factors for prediction of human cases of highly pathogenic
avian influenza H5N1in Egypt. The outcome measure was the
rate of occurrence of WHO-confirmed human cases of HPAI
H5N1 in a particular governorate, expressed as an incidence rate
(cases per million persons). A Poisson regression model was used to
analyze the association between the risk factors and the rate of
human cases due to the rarity of the event and that the outcome
variable was the count of human H5N1 cases on a particular day
Table 1. Number of days between first bird outbreak and human case for each season (9/1–8/31).
Governorate 9/2005–8/2006 9/2006–8/2007 9/2007–8/2008 9/2008–8/2009 9/2009–8/2010 9/2010–8/2011
Al Bahr al Ahmer
Al Buhayrah 91 50 296 254
Ad Daqahliyah 145 115 225 112 83
Al Fayyum 86 144 175 152 163 187
Al Gharbiyah 73 24 210 82 128
Al Iskandariyah 36 2142 95
Al Jizah 88
Al Minufiyah 84 55 14 141 134
Al Minya 127 202 171 150 13
Al Qahirah 46 63 221 56
Al Qalyubiyah 63 206 10 94 262
Al Wadi al Jadid
Al Isma`iliyah
As Suways 228 54
Ash Sharqiyah 164 223 96 118 58
Aswan 169
Asyut 258 125
Bani Suwayf 84 111 60
Bur Sa`id
Dumyat 294 114 23 30 230
Kafr ash Shaykh 80 11 45 130
Luxor
Matruh
Qina 68 21 63
Suhaj 60 142 23
Average 82 138 132 42 52 90
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043851.t001
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(on most days where cases occurred, there was only one case
reported in the country). The ratio of the deviance to degrees of
freedom (value/DF) was 1.038, indicating an acceptable goodness
of fit of the data for the Poisson distribution. The independent
variables analyzed included the demographic variables for each
governorate described above. Other independent variables
included the average temperature and humidity for the previous
30 days in each governorate. Finally, we analyzed as an
independent variable the occurrence, in the previous 14 days or
21 days in the same governorate, outbreaks of H5N1 avian
influenza in birds according to surveillance reports of OIE or
EMPRESi records.
The multivariate model was constructed using independent
variables that showed significant associations (p,=0.1) with the
outcome of human cases in the bivariate analysis. Next we tested
for collinearity between independent variables. Any two indepen-
dent variables with a Pearson’s correlation coefficient greater than
0.6 were considered collinear. For example duck and chicken
outbreaks were considered collinear, as were temperature and
humidity. If this was the case, the collinear variable that provided
the greatest explanatory value as determined by the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) was allowed to remain in the
multivariate model. In a similar fashion, we tested whether
outbreaks in ducks or chickens conferred greater risk, and whether
a time lag of 14 days or 21 days between a bird outbreak and a
human case yielded the greatest predictive value for the final
model (smallest value for AIC).
Positive Predictive Value and Sensitivity
We calculated the positive predictive value for a bird outbreak
by determining the proportion of bird outbreaks over the study
period that were followed by a human case of H5N1 in the same
governorate over the subsequent 2 week period:
Table 2. Predictors of human H5N1 case occurrence in a governorate.
Bivariate Multivariate
Risk Factor RR 95% CI p-value RR 95% CI p-value
Mean temperature last 30 days 0.94 0.92 0.95 ,.0001 0.94 0.92 0.96 ,.0001
Mean humidity last 30 days 1.01 1.00 1.03 0.054
Urbanization of Governorate 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.0002 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.0046
Poultry Density 1.45 1.19 1.76 0.0002 1.26 1.03 1.54 0.0218
GDP of Governorate 0.89 0.82 0.97 0.0056
Ducks
Outbreak with ducks in last 14-days 2.59 1.83 3.66 ,.0001
Outbreak with ducks in last 21-days 2.45 1.75 3.41 ,.0001
Chickens
Outbreak with chickens in last 14-days 2.64 1.91 3.65 ,.0001
Outbreak with chickens in last 21-days 2.30 1.67 3.18 ,.0001
Ducks and Chickens
Outbreak with ducks and chickens in last 14-days 2.48 1.70 3.61 ,.0001
Outbreak with ducks and chickens in last 21-days 2.36 1.66 3.35 ,.0001
Ducks or Chickens
Outbreak with ducks or chickens in last 14-days 2.64 1.91 3.65 ,.0001 1.91 1.37 2.67 0.0001
Outbreak with ducks or chickens in last 21-days 2.30 1.66 3.17 ,.0001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043851.t002
Table 3. Positive Predictive Value (PPV) for bird outbreaks predicting the occurrence of a human case of H5N1 HPAI in the same
governorate within the next 14 days.
Time Period # Bird Outbreaks # with Human Case within 14 days Positive Predictive Value
9/1/2005–8/31/2006 616 85 13.8
9/1/2006–8/31/2007 270 14 5.2
9/1/2007–8/31/2008 166 5 3.0
9/1/2008–8/31/2009 134 21 15.7
9/1/2009–8/31/2010 398 61 15.3
9/1/2010–8/31/2011 453 70 15.5
Total 2037 256 12.6
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043851.t003
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(number of human cases with a bird outbreak in
the same governorate over the previous twoweeks)
(total number of bird outbreaks)
Similarly, we calculated the sensitivity of bird outbreaks to
predict human cases as the proportion of human cases that were
preceded by a reported bird outbreak in the previous two weeks,
or:
(number of human cases with a bird outbreak in the
same governorate over the previous twoweeks)
(total number of human cases)
Results
Temporal and Spatial Patterns in Animal and Human
Cases of H5N1
Figure 1 shows the epidemic curves for bird outbreaks and
human cases of H5N1 HPAI in Egypt, by month, during the years
2006 through 2011. As Figure 1 shows, after an initial intense
period of disease spread in 2006 following introduction of virus
into the country, the pattern of bird and human cases appear to
develop a cyclic pattern, with peaks in the winter months. In
general, the number of bird outbreaks exceeds the number of
human cases for most time periods.
Temporal comparison of data streams at the national
level
Figure 2 shows the aggregated, filtered curves for human cases
and bird outbreaks of H5N1 in Egypt between 2006 and 2011,
normalized to a similar scale. This statistical smoothing process
(see Methods) highlights the cyclical nature of the disease events.
The degree of linkage or concordance between these two
normalized curves was tested by a permutation test (see Methods)
to see whether shifting one of the curves in either direction in time
improved the statistical fit (the sum of the squared difference
between the normalized event values) for human H5N1 cases and
bird H5N1 outbreaks. It was found that the temporal alignment
implied by the data was highly significant (p = 0.01) suggesting a
temporal concordance between the bird and human cases. Among
all possible alignments tested in the permutation test, it was found
that the greatest concordance, that is the alignment that
minimized the mean square error, was for a two week lead in
human cases vs. bird outbreaks at the country level. In other
words, an increase in human cases tended to appear prior to a
corresponding increase in bird outbreaks during the annual cycles
of infection.
Spatial distribution by governorate of human cases and
bird outbreaks
Figures 3A and 3B show the pattern of occurrence of bird
outbreaks and human cases of H5N1 influenza A in the different
Egyptian governorates over the time period. These figures show
that the majority of bird outbreaks and human cases in Egypt have
occurred in governorates located along the Nile River and in the
delta region. These patterns reflect the higher human and poultry
density that is present in governorates located near the Nile River,
as shown in Figures 4A and 4B.
Time Lags at the Governorate Level between First Report
of Bird Outbreaks and Human Cases
Table 1 shows the actual time lags (number of days) between the
date of the first bird outbreak from a particular governorate, and
the date of the first reported human case in that governorate over
6 different yearly time periods between September 2005 and
September 2011. In the first year and in general, reported bird
outbreaks preceded reported human cases by time lags ranging as
long as 294 days (average time lags each season ranging from 42–
138 days) but this was not always the case. In several instances, the
first human case in a particular season in a governorate preceded
any reported bird case in the same administrative district. These
instances appear as negative values for the time lags in the table.
Predictors for Human H5N1 Case Occurrence at the
Governorate Level
Table 2 shows the results of predictive modeling (using Poisson
regression) of risk factors for the occurrence of a human case of
H5N1 influenza A infection in a particular Egyptian governorate
over the study period. A number of factors showed a significant
bivariate association with the risk of a human case, including a
lower temperature over the previous 30 days, lower percentage of
urbanization of the governorate, lower GDP, higher poultry
density, and the occurrence of a bird outbreak in the previous time
period. Bird outbreaks in the previous 14 days were more strongly
associated with human case risk than a case in the past 21 days. In
the multivariate model, factors remaining significant included
Table 4. Sensitivity for bird outbreaks predicting the occurrence of a human case of H5N1 HPAI in the same governorate within
the next 14 days.
Time Period # Human Cases # of Bird Outbreaks within 14 days prior Sensitivity
9/1/2005–8/31/2006 14 12 85.7
9/1/2006–8/31/2007 24 8 33.3
9/1/2007–8/31/2008 12 4 33.3
9/1/2008–8/31/2009 33 10 30.3
9/1/2009–8/31/2010 26 14 53.8
9/1/2010–8/31/2011 37 23 62.2
Total 146 71 48.6
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043851.t004
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lower mean temperature in the preceding 30 days, lesser
urbanization of the governorate, higher poultry density, and the
report of a bird outbreak in the governorate involving either
chickens or ducks during the preceding 14 days. This model had
the best AIC value of the other possible models tested (AIC
= 1915.5).
The positive predictive value and sensitivity for a bird outbreak
predicting the occurrence of a human case, is shown in Tables 3
and 4 for each of the annual disease cycles as well as the entire
observation period. The positive predictive value, i.e. the
probability that a bird outbreak will be followed by a human
case in the same governorate during the subsequent 14 days,
ranged from as low as 3% to more than 15%, with an average of
approximately 12% (indicating a greater than 1 in 8 chance of
seeing a human case in the governorate in the two weeks after a
bird outbreak). The sensitivity indicates the proportion of human
cases that were preceded by a reported bird outbreak in the
previous two weeks. The sensitivity of bird outbreaks for
subsequent human cases was high in the first year of the outbreak
(85%), but fluctuated in later years, with an overall rate of almost
50%. This implies that 50% of the human cases occurred without
a bird outbreak being reported in the governorate in the preceding
2 weeks.
Discussion
Results of this study demonstrate both the potential value and
challenges of comparing animal and human surveillance data
streams for avian influenza H5N1 at a national and local level in a
country such as Egypt that is experiencing ongoing outbreaks of
infection in both humans and birds. Our analysis of these data
streams between 2006 and 2011 indicates that there are linkages
between the cyclical pattern of case occurrence in birds and
humans. At the governorate level, the date of the first reported
animal outbreak generally (but not always) preceded reported
human cases during a given season. In a multivariate model, a
poultry outbreak in the previous 14 days was a risk factor for the
occurrence of a human case in a governorate. Other predictive
factors included lower temperature in the previous 30-day period,
lower urbanization and GDP of the governorate, and higher
poultry density. The positive predictive value and the sensitivity of
bird outbreaks to predict human cases in the same governorate
within a two week period fluctuated over time, but in general were
low.
The analysis had a number of important limitations. It relied on
surveillance data of human and bird cases reported first to national
agencies and then international agencies. While this suggests that
the data were in compliance with the standards of those
international organizations (the World Health Organization for
human cases and the World Organisation for Animal Health/OIE
and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization/FAO for bird
cases), surveillance data are inherently subject to bias, and it is
likely that the true incidence of both human and avian infection
with HPAI differed somewhat from what was reported. Passive
surveillance such as these data relies on recognition and reporting
of clinically recognized cases. Subclinical cases or asymptomatic
shedding of virus, which has been reported in vaccinated birds,
would not be detected by passive surveillance. For some of the
analytic comparisons of bird and human data, we used the count
of a bird outbreak, rather than the number of birds affected. It
should be noted that this aggregate outbreak measure will weight
an outbreak over a small population, such as a rural farm, equal to
an outbreak to a large breeding facility. While this choice of
weighting is not ideal, individual bird outbreak data was found to
be incomplete and variable and this aggregate approach helps
mitigate underreporting in smaller production situations. It is also
possible that subclinical cases in humans could go undetected by
surveillance efforts; however, studies in other countries have rarely
found significant evidence of subclinical human infection with
H5N1 HPAI [17]. Other possible biases in the data could include
enhanced surveillance for human cases in an area that is
experiencing an intense epizootic, or, conversely, enhanced
surveillance for poultry cases occurring after the diagnosis of a
human case in the same region. Misclassification of data could
occur in numerous ways, such as a human case seeking medical
care in a different governorate where infection took place, leading
to exposure misclassification.
Despite such limitations, these publicly available surveillance
data represent an important assessment of human and avian
infection in Egypt over this time period, and the value of
integrating the human and animal data streams is supported by a
number of biologically plausible results.
The statistically significant linkage between the human and
animal occurrences of H5N1 HPAI indicates that there are shared
environmental factors driving infection in both humans and
animals [18]. Since bird outbreaks were more numerous than
human cases, examining both data streams could make it easier to
detect such patterns. The permutation test demonstrated that the
two curves were closely linked in time. The fact that both the
animal and human cases occurred in a cyclic pattern during the
year with peaks in the late winter has been reported elsewhere [9].
The best fit of the permutation test showed that the human cycles
preceded the bird cycles by approximately 14 days. This could be
an artifact of the statistical smoothing process or a reflection of
enhanced surveillance in human populations. The finding of peaks
in the late winter months for both birds and humans could relate
to our finding in the multivariate model that decreased temper-
ature in the previous 30 days was associated with an increased risk
of human H5N1 infection. This is also in agreement with
experimental studies that have found that increased environmental
temperature decreases the efficiency of influenza A transmission
[19] and the survival of influenza on surfaces [20,21,22]. It is
possible that climate factors affect environmental transmission of
influenza through aerosols or surface contact even in a subtropical
country such as Egypt. It is also possible that crowding of birds and
contact between birds and humans could be greater during colder
weather periods.
The utility of using bird outbreak information to predict human
infection risk was supported by the finding that first outbreak
reports in birds usually preceded reports of human cases at the
governorate level, and that bird outbreaks, along with lower GDP
and urbanization and higher poultry density, were a risk factor for
the occurrence of a human case. The fact that a predictive model
could be constructed using surveillance case reports and demo-
graphic data available at the governorate level suggests that such
data could be used to provide ongoing mapping of human risk.
This could supplement existing risk assessment efforts by
identifying future hotspots that experts might not have suspected,
and allow for enhanced preventive efforts. Alternatively, if the
pattern of human cases deviates markedly from the predictions of
the model, it could be an indication of altered transmission
dynamics and routes of introduction.
At the same time, predictive models for zoonotic disease
occurrence should receive the same evidence-based scrutiny as
medical diagnostic tests in order to determine their practical
usefulness. We assessed the positive predictive value and sensitivity
of a bird outbreak in a governorate for predicting a human case
within a two-week period. The results indicated that, on average,
Human and Animal H5N1 Surveillance Data 2006–2011
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only one time out of eight did a human case follow a reported bird
outbreak within 2 weeks in the same governorate. In addition,
approximately 50% of the reported human cases occurred without
a reported bird outbreak in the two preceding weeks in the same
governorate. These sobering data are a reminder that zoonotic
transmission of H5N1 HPAI is relatively rare, and the risk of
human cases in Egypt remains low even in the presence of bird
outbreak activity. At the same time, the yearly fluctuation in results
suggests variability in disease control and reporting effectiveness.
Further extension of these integrated surveillance modeling
approaches appears warranted. Future analyses could include viral
strain and other genomic data from viruses isolated from human
and animal cases, since some strains of avian influenza may more
easily cross the species barrier. Developing more precise data sets
for both human variables such as the location of the human cases
(for this analysis only available at the governorate level) and
greater accuracy of poultry density mapping and demographic
data including the quality and extent of veterinary services could
also help refine the risk analyses by using techniques such as spatial
cluster analysis in a time-dependent fashion. Achieving these goals
would necessarily involve continued quality assessment and
improvement in animal and human disease surveillance capability
and effectiveness for zoonotic influenza.
In addition to prediction of human risk, this study suggests other
benefits of systematically comparing human and animal disease
surveillance data streams for H5N1 influenza A. We found that
the time lag between first reported bird outbreak and first reported
human case varied widely between governorates. Reasons for this
variation could include regional differences in the quality and
completeness of surveillance systems and reporting. It is possible
that in some areas, resources for surveillance and diagnosis of
human cases exceeds that available for animal disease detection
and reporting. In such cases, humans may serve as the ‘‘sentinels’’
for the presence of disease in nearby animals. Ongoing analysis of
such time lags could highlight gaps in surveillance systems and
assist with quality control efforts. Unusual time lags could indicate
data accuracy problems including misclassification of the actual
location or date of human or bird cases and lapses in surveillance
efforts. In addition, reasons for regional variability in time lags
could include local differences in the intensity and insecurity
associated with zoonotic exposures. One such difference could be
the degree of zoonotic risk faced by workers in larger poultry
confinement operations compared to exposures in the village
setting (which was associated with increased human risk in our
analysis). Unusual time lags between reported bird outbreaks and
human cases may also indicate a novel form of disease
introduction, either through wild birds, poultry trade, environ-
mental contamination, or a change in transmission patterns such
as increased efficiency of human-to-human transmission. Overall,
we believe that our findings argue for greater collaboration
between animal and human health surveillance efforts for zoonotic
influenza, and ongoing integration of case surveillance data
streams with incorporation of climate and demographic data for
enhanced prediction, as well as the possibility of coordinated
outbreak investigation of both human and animal populations.
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